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Abstract
We consider two diﬀerent approaches to security issues. In the ﬁrst one bisimulation equivalences
(dynamic veriﬁcations) are exploited to verify non-interference security properties on a CCS-like
process algebra calculus. In the second approach control ﬂow analysis (static analysis) is applied
to verify security properties in Mobile Ambient calculus. We analyze how a simple electronic
commerce case study can be modeled and its integrity veriﬁed using the two techniques. The tools
CoPS and Banana are used to perform the computations.
Keywords: Security Process Algebra, Non-Interference,
Mobile Ambients, Nesting Analysis, Integrity.
1 Introduction
In the last decades the protection of conﬁdential data from undesired accesses
has been widely investigated both on systems and networks. Information is
typically protected via some access control policy, limiting accesses of entities
(e.g., users, processes) to data. There are diﬀerent levels of ﬂexibility of access
control policies depending on the possibility for one entity to change rights to
its own data. In the case of mandatory policies, entities cannot change access
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rights. For example Multilevel Security [1] imposes that entities and data are
associated to (ordered) security levels and no access to data at higher level is
ever possible. This strong security policy has been designed to avoid internal
attacks performed by Trojan Horse programs. Unfortunately, even with a
multilevel security policy data can be indirectly leaked by Trojan Horses (see,
e.g., [18,22]).
The necessity of controlling information ﬂow as a whole (both direct and
indirect) motivated Goguen and Meseguer in introducing the notion of Non-
Interference [14]. Non-Interference formalizes the absence of information ﬂow
within deterministic systems. Given a system in which confidential (i.e., high
level) and public (i.e., low level) information may coexist, non-interference
requires that conﬁdential inputs never aﬀect the outputs of the public in-
terface of the system, i.e., they never interfere with low level users. If such
a property holds, one can conclude that no information ﬂow is ever possi-
ble from high to low level. In [11], Focardi and Gorrieri express the con-
cept of non-interference in the Security Process Algebra (SPA) language, in
terms of bisimulation semantics: a system is secure if what a low level user
sees of the system is not modiﬁed by composing any high level attacker with
the system. In [13] a persistent version of the security property deﬁned in
[11] has been introduced. Persistency has been proved to be fundamental
to deal with processes in dynamic contexts, i.e., contexts that can be re-
conﬁgured at runtime. Algorithms to eﬃciently verify this and other bisim-
ulation based persistent security properties have been presented in [2] and
implemented in the tool CoPS, Checker of Persistent Security, available at
http://www.dsi.unive.it/∼mefisto/CoPS/.
The calculus of Mobile Ambients has been introduced in [6,7] with the
main aim of explicitly modeling mobility. Ambients are arbitrarily nested
entities which can move around through suitable capabilities. Big eﬀorts
have been devoted to the study of Control Flow Analysis (CFA) of such a
calculus [16,20]. In particular, some analysis have been applied to the ver-
iﬁcation of security properties [3,8,17]. The idea of [3,17] is to compute an
over-approximation of ambient nestings that may occur during process com-
putation, thus detecting possible intrusions and unwanted information ﬂows.
Since the computation of ambient nesting analysis like [3,16,20] requires con-
siderably high complexities, the design of eﬃcient techniques turns out to be
very important. Time and space eﬃcient algorithms to compute the control
ﬂow analysis described in [3,16] have been presented in [4] and implemented
in the tool Banana, Boundary Ambient Nesting ANAlysis, available
at http://www.dsi.unive.it/∼mefisto/BANANA/.
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However, many applications require models of security not focused on the
complete absence of information ﬂow, but on the preservation of the integrity
of the resources, that guarantees that information ﬂowing from one place to
another must traverse speciﬁc points of the path. For instance, consider the
E-Commerce Processing System described in [15]. The system represents a
process where:
• an order is submitted electronically by a client;
• an e-sales process ensures that the order is correct (e.g., the prices and
discounts are correct), and, if so, passes it to the process accounts receivable;
• accounts receivable interacts with a credit card clearing house and, if every-
thing is ﬁne, it passes the order to the shipping process;
• the shipping process sends the items to the client.
In [15] the authors use Linear Temporal Logic to specify information ﬂow
policies for SELinux, which can then be checked via model-checking. The
E-Commerce example is used to illustrate the technique. In particular, in this
example it is important to ensure that, if the internal channels of communi-
cation are secure, then the action’s casual chain is always the same even in
presence of a malicious attacker (e.g., it is not possible that an unpaid order
is shipped).
In this paper we show how to use both non-interference security properties
and control ﬂow analysis to check the integrity of the E-Commerce Processing
System. In the two approaches we take a common starting point, then we
concentrate on diﬀerent aspects. In particular, in Section 2 we describe the
non-interference approach by introducing the language and the security prop-
erties (Section 2.1), brieﬂy describing the tool CoPS (Section 2.2), modeling
the E-Commerce system (Section 2.3). Section 3 is devoted to the control ﬂow
analysis approach: we present the language and the nesting analysis (Section
3.1); we outline the features of the tool Banana (Section 3.2); we model and
study the E-Commerce system (Sections 3.3 and 3.4). The paper ends with
Section 4 containing some comparisons and conclusions.
2 Non-Interference Approach
2.1 Persistent Security Properties
The Security Process Algebra (SPA) [11] is a variation of Milner’s CCS [19],
where the set of visible actions is partitioned into high level and low level
actions in order to specify multilevel systems. The syntax of SPA processes is
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as follows:
E ::= 0 | a.E | E + E | E|E | E \ v | E[f ] | Z
The semantics is the same as in CCS. Intuitively, 0 is the empty process;
a.E performs an action a and continues as E; E1 + E2 is the nondetermin-
istic choice between E1 and E2; E1|E2 is the parallel composition of E1 and
E2, where executions are interleaved, possibly synchronized on complemen-
tary input/output actions, producing the silent action τ ; E \ v prevents E
from performing actions in the set v; E[f ] is the process E whose actions are
renamed via the relabeling function f ; the constant Z is associated with a
deﬁnition Z
def
= E and is used to deﬁne recursive processes.
As an example, a binary memory cell which initially contains the value
0 and is accessible by both high and low level users through the read and
write operations (e.g., rh0 represents the high read of 0) can be formalized as
follows:
M0
def
= rh0 . M0 + wh0 . M0 + wh1 . M1 + rl0 . M0 + wl0 . M0 +wl1 . M1
M1
def
= rh1 . M1 + wh0 . M0 + wh1 . M1 + rl1 . M1 + wl0 . M0 +wl1 . M1
M0 and M1 are totally insecure processes: no access control is implemented
and a high level malicious entity may write conﬁdential information into the
memory cell which can be then read by any low level user. Our security
property will aim at detecting this kind of ﬂaws, even in more subtle and
interesting situations.
The non-interference property named Persistent Bisimulation-based Non
Deducibility on Composition ﬁrst introduced in [13] can be deﬁned in terms
of unwinding conditions (see [2]): if a state F of a secure process performs
a high level action moving to a state G, then F also performs a sequence of
silent actions moving to a state K which is equivalent to G for a low level
user. We report here the deﬁnition of P BNDC denoting by (
τ
→)∗ a sequence
of zero or more silent actions. We also use ≈ for weak bisimulation (see [19]).
Definition 2.1 [P BNDC [2]] A process E is P BNDC if for all F reachable
from E, if F
h
→ G, then F (
τ
→)∗K and G \H ≈ K \H .
The memory cell deﬁned above is not P BNDC. In fact, there is a direct
information ﬂow from high to low level. We can redeﬁne the cell by eliminating
any low level read operation as follows:
M0
def
= rh0 . M0 + wh0 . M0 + wh1 . M1 + wl0 . M0 + wl1 . M1
M1
def
= rh1 . M1 + wh0 . M0 + wh1 . M1 + wl0 . M0 + wl1 . M1
Now the memory cell is P BNDC.
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In [2] an eﬃcient polynomial algorithm to verify P BNDC is described.
The algorithm is based on the reduction of the problem of checking the security
property to the problem of checking strong bisimulation between two graphs.
The tool CoPS implements such algorithm. As far as the strong bisimulation
underlying algorithm is concerned, CoPS allows the user to choose between
the Paige and Tarjan’s algorithm [21] and the fast bisimulation algorithm
described in [9]. This choice does not aﬀect the worst-case complexities.
2.2 CoPS
The tool CoPS, available at http://www.dsi.unive.it/∼mefisto/CoPS/, is
an automatic checker of multilevel system security properties. It implements
the polynomial algorithm described in [2] to check P BNDC. Moreover, it
allows to check other security properties studied in [2].
CoPS consists of a graphical interface and a kernel module. The graphical
interface has been implemented in Java to get a large portability and allows to:
• Insert the process(es) to be checked in the editor pane. The process(es)
can be either typed or loaded from a ﬁle. A tree is automatically drawn to
facilitate the navigation among processes. The syntax is highlighted to get
a better readability. Both fonts and colors can be changed by the user.
• Select the security property to be checked and start the veriﬁcation. It is also
possible to check whether two processes are strongly or weakly bisimilar.
• Read the verification results. Some time/space statistics are shown together
with the security result. Moreover, syntax errors are reported.
• View the graph representing the semantics of the process(es). This can be
also saved in a ﬁle whose type (e.g., jpg, gif, eps) can be chosen by the user.
The kernel module has been implemented in standard C to obtain good per-
formances and consists of:
• A parser which checks for syntax errors and builds the syntax tree out of
the SPA process.
• A semantics graph generator which elaborates the syntax tree to generate
an adjacency-list representation of the graph associated to the process.
• A verifier which transforms the graph in order to use a strong bisimulation
algorithm to perform the security check.
The graph visualization requires the installation of Graphviz, available
at http://www.research.att.com/sw/tools/graphviz/. The kernel execu-
tion can be personalized by using the Settings option in the Edit menu.
Many options can be chosen, e.g. by setting the path of Graphviz and the
format of the generated graph, choosing the bisimulation algorithm to be used
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(the Paige and Tarjan’s one [21] or the one presented in [9]), avoiding the graph
generation, or setting the use/dimension of an hash table which speeds up the
graph generation.
It is possible to avoid the use of the graphical interface and use directly
the kernel via command line (checker --help shows the help).
Installation and conﬁguration instructions together with a tutorial on the
use of CoPS can be found in the tool site.
2.3 E-Commerce Integrity in CoPS via P BNDC
Let us model the E-Commerce Processing System, described in Section 1, in
the SPA language and use CoPS to check that the casual chain remains the
same even in presence of a malicious attacker.
In order to model the E-Commerce System in SPA and exploit P BNDC
to check its integrity we use a standard technique introduced in the modeling
of cryptographic protocols [10,12]. P BNDC is based on the assumption that,
given two groups of users, H and L, there is no information ﬂow from H to L
iﬀ there is no way for a user of level H to modify the behavior of a user of level
L. In the case of protocols we can assume that the users of level L are the
honest participants, while H is the external, possibly malicious, environment.
Since an intruder may have complete control of the network, we assume that
the channels are of level H . In this way all the protocol actions are of level
H , while the actions of level L are extra observable actions that are added to
the protocol to check its properties. Hence, the way in which the low level
actions are added depends on the security property we are interested in. For
instance, in the case of integrity, if we want to check that an action h2 can be
performed only after the execution of an action h1, we add a low level action
l1 after each h1 and a low level action l2 after each h2 and we check that in
the low level behavior l2 occurs only after l1.
Notice that P BNDC exploits bisimulation as observational equivalence.
Similarly, the Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC ) property introduced
in [11], instantiates the non-interference schema using trace equivalence in-
stead of bisimulation. In [12] it has been shown that trace equivalence, and
hence NDC, is suﬃcient for verifying several protocol properties, such as au-
thentication, and bisimulation is necessary in other cases, such as fairness.
The bisimulation relation is dead-lock sensitive, while trace equivalence is
not. Hence, in the case of integrity the use of bisimulation instead of trace
equivalence allows us to check that also the dead-locks in the casual chain are
unalterable, i.e. the process under attack reaches a dead-lock after the action
sequence s iﬀ the process in isolation reaches a dead-lock after the sequence
s. In particular, the use of bisimulation ensures that all the branching points
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Fig. 1. E-Commerce: basic case.
in the execution chains do not change under attacks.
We start modeling only some basic aspects of the process, then we proceed
adding details to the model. In Figure 1 we give a graphical representation of
the E-Commerce Processing System assuming that the agents involved com-
municate directly through channels (the arrows in the picture). Client sends
an order containing prices, payment data and address. Let us assume that
Client sends a correct order, i.e., both prices and payment are correct. We
use the action itemprice&credcardnum&address to represent this fact 3 . Then
Client waits to receive the items. The process E-sales receives the order, and
if the prices are correct it sends the payment data and the address to the
process AccountsRec. We use the action credcardnum&address to model the
fact that the correct payment data are sent to AccountsRec. Similarly, if the
payment is correct AccountsRec asks, through the action address, to the pro-
cess Shipping to send the items. As said above, since an intruder could have
control over the network, all the involved channels are of level high. Hence,
in the SPA language we get the following processes.
E-Commerce
def
= (Client |Server)
Client
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address .items.0
Server
def
= E-sales |AccountsRec|Shipping
E-sales
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address.credcardnum&address . 0
+ itemprice&wrongcardnum&address.wrongcardnum&address .0
AccountsRec
def
= credcardnum&address.address .0
Shipping
def
= address.items .0
Notice that if the prices are correct while the payment data are wrong the
process E-sales reads the prices and outputs the remaining set of data (i.e.,
payment and address). In this case AccountsRec blocks the process since
it cannot read a wrong payment. Another possibility would be to add to
3 In the case of an order with wrong payment data we use the action item-
price&wrongcardnum&address.
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AccountsRec the alternative behavior corresponding to the synchronization
with actions denoting the reception of wrong data. This change would not
aﬀect the considerations which follows.
We want to check that in the execution chains only the orders with correct
prices are sent to AccountsRec and only the orders with correct price and
payment data are shipped. To verify this property, we add the low level
actions okl1, okl2, and okl3 in diﬀerent execution points.
E-Commerce
def
= (Client |Server)
Client
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address .items.0
Server
def
= E-sales |AccountsRec|Shipping
E-sales
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address.okl1.credcardnum&address . 0
+ itemprice&wrongcardnum&address.okl1.wrongcardnum&address .0
AccountsRec
def
= credcardnum&address.okl2.address .0
Shipping
def
= address.okl3.items .0
When there are no intruders interacting with the process E-Commerce the
low level behavior is of the form okl1.okl2.okl3.0. This can be easily veriﬁed
in CoPS by checking that E-Commerce\H is weak bisimilar to the latter. The
process E-Commerce is not P BNDC. In particular, the state Shipping which
is reachable from E-Commerce does not satisfy the unwinding condition of
Deﬁnition 2.1: Shipping
address
−→ okl3.items.0, and Shipping does not reach with
any sequence of τ transitions any state E such that okl3.items.0\H ≈ E \H .
Such a situation, automatically detected by CoPS, represents the fact that a
high level intruder could directly synchronize with the process Shipping and
force the system to ship orders which have not been paid. Hence, the lack of
integrity is due to the fact that the intruder can communicate with process
Shipping.
If we believe that our channels are secure and the intruder cannot directly
communicate with the processes inside the E-Commerce system, we can model
this fact using a restriction over the channels. Hence, we get the following
model.
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E-Commerce
def
= (Client |Server)\H
Client
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address .items.0
Server
def
= E-sales |AccountsRec|Shipping
E-sales
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address.okl1.credcardnum&address . 0
+ itemprice&wrongcardnum&address.okl1wrongcardnum&address .0
AccountsRec
def
= credcardnum&address.okl2.address .0
Shipping
def
= address.okl3.items .0
In this case the process E-Commerce satisﬁes the three security properties
checked by CoPS, which implies that the casual chain order is always respected.
We can now increase the power of the client by adding the option of query-
ing the system through an untrusted channel, as represented in Figure 2. In
Fig. 2. E-Commerce: queries.
this case, the queries are not restricted high level actions, named okh1, okh2,
okh3. In order to obtain a secure system, we need to add timeouts (τ actions),
i.e., the system does not wait the queries forever.
E-Commerce
def
= (Client |Server)\Hc
Client
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address .items.0
Server
def
= E-sales |AccountsRec|Shipping
E-sales
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address.
(okh1 .okl1.credcardnum&address .0
+ τ .okl1.credcardnum&address .0)+
itemprice&wrongcardnum&address.
(okh1 .okl1.wrongcardnum&address .0
+ τ .okl1.wrongcardnum&address .0)
AccountsRec
def
= credcardnum&address.
(okh2 .oklow2.address .0+τ .oklow2.address .0)
Shipping
def
= address.(okh3 .oklow3.items .0+ τ .oklow3.items .0)
where Hc ⊆ H is the set of actions {item, itemprice&credcardnum&address,
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Fig. 3. E-Commerce: ﬁles and queries.
itemprice&wrongcardnum&address, credcardnum&address, address}. We can
use CoPS to verify that the systems is P BNDC. Moreover, we can ask to CoPS
a graphical representation of E-Commerce\H . In the graphical representation
we can see the sequences of low level actions when the system is not under
attack. Since the system is secure, the sequences remain the same even in
presence of any malicious attacker.
Finally, another interesting variation in the modeling of the system con-
sists of introducing intermediate ﬁles in which the information are stored (see
Figure 3). In this case it is important to model the ﬁles carefully: each order
has to be processed exactly once. For this reason each ﬁle has a state empty
in which it is reset after the information have been read. We show below part
of the model written in the SPA language.
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E-Commerce
def
= (Client |Server)\Hc
Client
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address.items.0
Server
def
= Socket-empty |E-sales|Filepaydata-empty
|AccountsRec| Fileaddress-empty | Shipping
Socket-empty
def
= itemprice&credcardnum&address.Socket-full-okok
+wrongitemprice&credcardnum&address.Socket-full-nook
+itemprice&wrongcardnum&address.Socket-full-okno
+wrongitemprice&wrongcardnum&address.Socket-full-nono
Socket-full-okok
def
= socket-itemprice&credcardnum&address.Socket-empty
Socket-full-nook
def
= socket-wrongitemprice&credcardnum&address.Socket-empty
Socket-full-okno
def
= socket-itemprice&wrongcardnum&address.Socket-empty
Socket-full-nono
def
= socket-wrongitemprice&wrongcardnum&address.Socket-empty
E-sales
def
= socket-itemprice&credcardnum&address.
(okh1 .okl1.credcardnum&address.0+τ .. . . )+
socket-wrongitemprice&credcardnum&address.
(noh1 .nol1.0+τ .nol1.0)+. . .
. . .
Also in this case the system is secure, since it is P BNDC.
3 Control Flow Analysis Approach
3.1 Mobile Ambients and Nesting Analysis
The Mobile Ambient calculus has been introduced in [6] with the main pur-
pose of explicitly modeling mobility. Indeed, ambients are arbitrarily nested
boundaries which can move around through suitable capabilities. The syntax
of processes is given as follows, where n ∈ Amb denotes an ambient name.
P,Q ::= (νn)P restriction | n
a
[ P ] ambient
| 0 inactivity | in
t
n.P capability to enter n
| P | Q composition | out
t
n.P capability to exit n
| !P replication | open
t
n.P capability to open n
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Intuitively, the restriction (νn)P introduces the new name n and limits its
scope to P ; P | Q is P and Q running in parallel; replication provides recursion
and iteration. By n
a
[ P ] we denote the ambient named n with the process
P running inside it. The capabilities in
t
n and out
t
n move their enclosing
ambients in and out ambient n, respectively; the capability open
t
n is used
to dissolve a sibling ambient n. Labels on ambients and on transitions are
introduced as it is customary in static analysis to indicate “program points”.
They will be useful in the next paragraphs when developing the analysis.
The operational semantics of a process P is given through a suitable reduc-
tion relation → and a structural congruence ≡ between processes. Intuitively,
P → Q represents the possibility for P of reducing to Q through some com-
putation (see [6] for more details).
For instance, let P1 be a process modeling an envelope sent from venice to
pisa:
venice[ envelope[ out venice.in pisa.0 ] | Q ] | pisa[ open envelope.0 ]
Initially, envelope is in site venice. Then, it exits venice and enters site pisa
by applying its capabilities out venice and in pisa, respectively. Once site
pisa receives envelope, it reads its content by consuming its open envelope
capability. Finally, P1 reaches the state venice[Q ] | pisa[ 0 ] .
To deal with security issues, information is classiﬁed into diﬀerent levels
of conﬁdentiality. This is obtained by exploiting the labeling of the ambi-
ents. In particular, the set of ambient labels is partitioned into three disjoint
sets: high, low and boundary labels. Ambients labeled with boundary labels
(boundary ambients) are the ones responsible for conﬁning conﬁdential infor-
mation. Information leakage occurs if a high level ambient exits a boundary,
thus becoming possibly exposed to a malicious ambient attack. In the follow-
ing examples, we will use b to label boundaries, h for high level ambients, and
c for capabilities. For instance, let P2 be a labeled extension of process P1,
in which the envelope contains conﬁdential data hdata (labeled high) which
needs to be safely sent from venice to pisa.
veniceb1 [ envelopeb2 [ outc1 venice.inc2 pisa.0 |
hdatah[ 0 ] ] ] |
pisab3 [ openc4 envelope.0 ]
In this case, venice, pisa and envelope must be labeled boundary to protect
hdata during the whole execution. See [3] for more detail.
In [16], Nielson et al. introduce a Control Flow Analysis of a process P
aiming at modeling the possible ambient nestings occurring in the execution
of P . It works on pairs (Iˆ , Hˆ). The ﬁrst component Iˆ is a set of labels’ pairs
which records all nestings: if process P , during its execution, contains an
ambient labeled a having inside either a capability or an ambient labeled ,
then (a, ) is expected to belong to Iˆ. The second component Hˆ keeps track
of the correspondence between names and labels.
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The analysis is deﬁned as usual by a representation and a speciﬁcation
function. The representation function aims at mapping concrete values to
their best abstract representation. It is given in terms of a function βCF (P )
which maps process P into a pair (Iˆ , Hˆ) corresponding to the initial state of
P , with respect to an enclosing ambient labeled with . In particular, the
representation of a process P is deﬁned as βCFenv(P ), env being a special label
to denote the external environment. Consider for example process P2. Its
representation function is
βCFenv(P2) = ({(env, b1), (env, b3), (b1, b2), (b2, h), (b2, c1), (b2, c2), (b3, c4)},
{(b1, venice), (b2, envelope), (h, hdata), (b3, pisa)}),
where all ambient nestings are captured by the ﬁrst component, while all the
correspondences between ambients and labels of P2 are kept by the second
one.
The speciﬁcation states a closure condition of a pair (Iˆ , Hˆ) with respect to
all the possible moves executable on a process P . It mostly relies on recursive
calls on subprocesses except for the three capabilities open, in, and out, where
the result of performing that capability must be recorded in Iˆ. Consider again
process P2. The ﬁrst component of its least solution is
Iˆ = {(env, b1), (env, b2), (env, b3), (b1, b2), (b2, h), (b2, c1), (b2, c2),
(b3, b2), (b3, h), (b3, b3), (b3, c1), (b3, c2), (b3, c4)}.
Notice that the analysis correctly captures through the pair (env, b2) the
possibility for envelope to exit from venice.
In [3], a more accurate abstract domain that separately considers nesting
inside and outside security boundaries is proposed, yielding to a much more
sophisticated control ﬂow analysis for detecting unwanted boundary crossing,
i.e., information leakage. The main idea is to distinguish among nestings either
protected or unprotected by boundaries.
The notion of “boundary ambient” and the reﬁned control ﬂow analysis
can be further enhanced to infer which ambients should be “protected” to
guarantee the absence of information leakage for a given process. More specif-
ically, in [5] we consider a process P wherein only high level data are known
and the aim of the analysis is to detect which ambients among the “untrusted”
ones should be protected and labeled “boundary” to guarantee that the sys-
tem is secure. This problem can be properly addressed by re-executing the
Control Flow Analysis presented in [3]. A successful analysis infers boundary
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ambients until a ﬁx-point is reached, returning the set of ambients that should
be “protected”.
3.2 Banana
Banana, available at http://www.dsi.unive.it/∼mefisto/BANANA, analy-
ses the information leakage in mobile agent speciﬁcations through the analysis
described in [3,16]. In particular, all the analyses described in the previous
section have been implemented in the tool, i.e., the nesting analysis by Nielson
et al. [16] and the boundary nesting analysis of [3].
The main features of Banana are:
• A textual and graphical editor for Mobile Ambients, to specify and modify
the process by setting ambient nesting capabilities and security attributes
in a very user-friendly fashion.
• A parser which checks for syntax errors and builds the syntax tree out of
the Mobile Ambient process.
• An analyzer which computes an over-approximation of all possible nestings
occurring at run-time. The tool supports two diﬀerent control ﬂow analyses,
namely the one of Nielson et al. [16] and the one by Braghin et al. [3].
• A post-processing module, that interprets the results of the analysis in terms
of the boundary-based information-ﬂow model proposed in [3], where infor-
mation ﬂows correspond to leakages of high-level (i.e., secret) ambients out
of protective (i.e., boundary) ambients, toward the low-level (i.e., untrusted)
environment.
• A detailed output window reporting both the analysis and the security
results obtained by the post-processing module, and some statistics about
the computational costs of the performed analysis.
Banana is implemented in Java and strongly exploits the modularity of
object-oriented technology, thus allowing scalability to other analysis and ex-
tensions of the target language. Moreover, it is conceived as an applet based
on AWT and thus compatible with the majority of current web browsers sup-
porting Java. A tutorial about the use of Banana is available in the tool web
pages.
3.3 E-Commerce Integrity in Banana via CFA
Let us now model the E-Commerce Processing System in the pure Ambient
calculus, and then use the Banana tool to check the integrity of the process.
Notice that in the pure Ambient calculus there are not communication
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primitives. In the absence of such primitives, the exchange of a message be-
tween a Sender and a Receiver may be modeled as a sequence of out Sender
and inReceiver actions, performed by ambient message. In this way message
moves from Sender to Receiver, where it will be opened in order to read its
contents. Hence, the opening of an ambient is used to model the synchroniza-
tion among the Sender and the Receiver of the message.
We model the E-Commerce system in Mobile Ambients by representing
each principle and each protocol phase with an ambient. More speciﬁcally,
Client and Server ambients represent the main actors, while Server’s sub-
ambients model the phases the order goes through. The submission of orders
by clients, and the interaction among one protocol phase and the next one
correspond to message exchanges which we model as explained above. For in-
stance, itemprice moves from Client to E-sales, which is a Server sub-ambient,
where it is opened. To check that the order is properly formatted (i.e., the
item is available and the purchase price is correct), E-sales opens the ambi-
ent itemprice. When the order is correct, the opening of itemprice succeeds,
while in the case of a wrong order this ambient is named wrongitemprice thus
it cannot be opened (see also itemprice&wrongcardnum&address in Section
2.3). After the opening of the ambient itemprice, the interaction moves inside
the ambient AccountsRec, which checks that the payment data are correct by
opening the ambient creditcardnum. We summarize in the opening of credit-
cardnum all the interactions with the bank to receive the payment. Hence,
when the opening succeeds, the payment has been received. Finally, the Ship-
ping ambient uses the information contained in address to send the items to
the Client . In this way we get that the Server S of the E-Commerce system
is modeleed as follows (see also Figure 4):
Server[
E-sales[ open itemprice.0 ] |
AccountsRec[ open creditcardnum.0 ] |
Shipping[ open address. item[ out Shipping.out Server.inClient.0 ] ] ]
Notice that in our modeling each sub-ambient of the Server opens an ambi-
ent: each opening represents the fact that a checking phase has been passed.
Also the client must be explicitly modeled. The whole system will be the
parallel composition of the two. All the capabilities to move from one sub-
ambient of the Server to another have to be included in the sub-ambients of
the Client. In particular, itemprice has to exit from Client, enter into Server
and then into E-sales. If the order is correct, itemprice is opened. After the
opening of itemprice, an ambient creditcardnum has to enter into AccountsRec.
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out Shipping.out Server.in Client.0
item
Shipping
Server
AccountsRec
open creditcardnum.0
E-sales
open itemprice.0
open address.
Fig. 4. The E-Commerce Server.
Once creditcardnum has been opened, an ambient address has to move inside
Shipping where it is used to send the items. Hence, a correct client C1 can be
modeled as follows:
Client[
itemprice[ out Client.in Server.inE-sales.
creditcardnum[ outE-sales.inAccountsRec.
address[ outAccountsRec.in Shipping.0 ] ] ] ]
It is easy to see that in the execution of process S | C1 the ﬁrst checking
phase is passed with the opening of itemprice, then the second checking phase
is passed with the opening of creditcardnum, and ﬁnally the third checking
phase is passed with the opening of address. We are interested in ensuring
that the three checking phases are performed in the correct order, e.g., we do
not want that the address is opened inside Shipping before itemprice is opened
inside E-sales.
Using Banana to compute an over-approximation of the nestings of S |
C1, we get that (E-sales, itemprice), (AccountsRec, creditcardnum), and (Ship-
ping, address) belong to Iˆ. The pair (E-sales, itemprice) represents the fact
that the ﬁrst check correctly starts and ends. Similarly, the other pairs are
related to the second and the third checks. The correct order of the checks is
assured by the nesting of the ambients inside the client, which forces itemprice
to be opened before creditcardnum, and creditcardnum before address.
A honest client C2 sending a wrong payment is similar to the correct client,
but instead of the ambient creditcardnum it has an ambient wrongcardnum,
i.e., it is of the form:
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Client[
itemprice[ out Client.in Server.inE-sales.
wrongcardnum[ outE-sales.inAccountsRec.
address[ outAccountsRec.in Shipping.0 ] ] ] ]
In this case, during the execution of process S | C2, the ﬁrst check is passed,
while the second is not. Hence, the third check does not even start because
the process is blocked at the open creditcardnum action. The Iˆ set computed
by the tool captures correctly this fact, since the pairs (AccountsRec, credit-
cardnum), and (Shipping, address) are not in Iˆ. Since this does not break the
integrity of the E-Commerce system also this client is “correct”.
On the other hand, an intruder is a process which tries to corrupt the casual
chain, by skipping one of the checking phases. For example, the following
intruder C3 sends his address directly to the Shipping process. In this way he
receives the items without paying for them.
Client[ address[ out Client.in Server.in Shipping.0 ] ]
If we analyze S | C3 using Banana, we notice that the pair (Shipping, address)
is in Iˆ, while (E−sales, itemprice) and (AccountsRec, creditcardnum) are not
in Iˆ.
There are also more subtle intruders which we want to detect. For instance,
consider the process C4 of the form:
C1 | Intruder[ address[ out Intruder.in Server.in Shipping.0 ] ]
where C1 is the correct client. In this case even if Iˆcontains all the pairs which
were in the analysis of C1, the system can be corrupted, since there exists an
execution in which the intruder receives the items the client has payed for,
but unfortunately our analysis cannot detect this kind of attack.
Therefore, we start by giving a deﬁnition which aims at avoiding the latter
kind of intruders. In particular, we impose that there is at most one address
to which shipping the items. Moreover, we restrict the capabilities of the
client, since we do not want that the client performs the checks by himself by
opening some ambients. Finally, we impose some restrictions on the nesting of
the ambients in the initial state of the client. This last condition is necessary
to ensure that the checks are performed in the correct order. In the deﬁnition
we use the notation ambient1ambient2 to denote the fact that if there is
at least one occurrence of ambient2, then all the occurrences of ambient1 are
nested in ambient2.
Definition 3.1 [Syntactic Correctness] A client C is syntactically correct if
the following conditions hold:
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(i) each ambient occurs in C at most once and C cannot have ambients with
names Server, E−sales, AccountsRec, and Shipping;
(ii) C has not open capabilities, and the out and in capabilities in C are
only referred to the Client, Server, E−sales, AccountsRec, and Shipping
ambients;
(iii) addresscreditcardnumitemprice.
Notice that the conditions in the above deﬁnition are just syntactic checks.
Condition (iii) can be checked exploiting Banana, since, for instance, to check
creditcardnumitemprice it is suﬃcient to compute βCFenv(C) and, if itemprice
occurs in C, check that in the pairs of the form (x, creditcardnum) x is always
itemprice.
We have that clients C1, C2, and C3 satisfy Deﬁnition 3.1, while C4 does
not. Another intruder which is not syntactically correct is
Client[
itemprice[ out Client.in Server.inE-sales.0 ] |
credicardnum[ out Client.in Server.inAccountsRec.0 ] | . . . ]
because it does not satisfy Condition (i). In fact in this case there are execu-
tions in which the checks are not performed in the correct order.
We now want to use Banana to distinguish between the honest clients C1
and C2 and the intruder C3. First, we formalize the fact that the checks in
the execution chains are performed in the correct order. A prefix of a given
sequence of actions s = 〈a1, . . . , an〉 is a (possibly empty) sequence of the form
〈a1, . . . , ai〉, with i ≤ 0 ≤ n. Intuitively we want to accept only the executions
which are preﬁxes of the execution in which all the checks are performed in
the right order.
Definition 3.2 [Integrity] Let S be the E-Commerce Server and C be a syn-
tactically correct client. We say that S | C satisﬁes integrity if in all the
executions of S | C the open capabilities of S are executed in an order which
is a preﬁx of:
sopen = 〈open itemprice, open creditcardnum, open address〉
If the client is syntactically correct, the integrity can be veriﬁed by reading
the pairs in Iˆ. The conditions on the initial nestings inside Client imposed in
Deﬁnition 3.1 (condition (iii)) ensures that when the pairs of interest are in Iˆ,
they have been inserted in a certain order. Moreover, we prove that it is never
the case that the such pairs are in Iˆ because of an over-approximation. In
particular, in the case of a syntactically correct client, the following proposition
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translates the preﬁx requirement of Deﬁnition 3.2 in a preﬁx requirement over
Iˆ.
Proposition 3.3 Let S be the E-Commerce System and C be a syntactically
correct client. If Iˆ contains an unordered prefix of:
snesting = 〈(E-sales, itemprice), (AccountsRec, creditcardnum), (Shipping, address)〉
where Iˆ is such that (Iˆ , Hˆ) |=CF S | C, then S | C satisfies integrity.
Proof. We consider all the possible preﬁxes 〈a1, . . . , ai〉 of snesting and we
prove that if {a1, . . . , ai} is a subset of Iˆ (while ai+1, . . . , an are not in Iˆ), then
in all the executions in which aj , with j ≤ i, is a real nesting (i.e., a pair
added not because of over-approximation) also a1, . . . , aj−1 are real nesting.
If i = 0, then we have nothing to prove. Also the cases i = 1 and i =
2, j = 1 are trivial.
If i = 2 and j = 2, then in Iˆ we have the pairs (E-sales, itemprice) and
(AccountsRec, creditcardnum). Let us consider an execution in which the nest-
ing (AccountsRec, creditcardnum) occurs. Since (E-sales, itemprice) is in Iˆ the
ambient itemprice occurs in C. Hence, since C is syntactically correct, credit-
cardnum is nested in itemprice in the initial state of C. Since C is syntactically
correct, it has no open capabilities, and no out capabilities relatively to item-
price. Hence, itemprice has to be opened inside E-sales, i.e., also the nesting
(E-sales, itemprice) occurs in the execution under consideration.
Similarly we can prove the thesis in all the remaining cases.
In order to prove the proposition we have to prove that if we consider an
execution ex in which the preﬁx 〈a1, . . . , aj〉 of snesting occurs, then in ex the
open capabilities are executed in the order which corresponds to the preﬁx
length j of sopen. This is again an immediate consequence of condition (iii)
of Deﬁnition 3.1. 
Using Banana we get that S | C1 satisﬁes integrity, since Iˆ contains all the
three pairs required by Proposition 3.3. Also S | C2 satisﬁes integrity, since Iˆ
contains only the ﬁrst pair, which means that the execution has blocked after
the ﬁrst phase. On the other hand, if we consider S | C3, Iˆ contains a suﬃx
(instead of a preﬁx) of snesting. In fact S | C3 does not satisfy integrity, since
it skips two checks.
Notice that S | C can satisfy integrity even if Iˆ does not contain a preﬁx
of snesting, i.e., the vice-versa of Proposition 3.3 does not hold. Consider for
instance the client C5:
Client[ out Server. address[ out Client.in Server.in Shipping.0 ] ]
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In this case Iˆ contains the pair (Shipping,address) and not the other two pairs.
However, this is due to an over-approximation, since during the execution
out Server blocks the system S | C5.
3.4 Information Leakage
Let us now exploit the tool for what it was originally intended, that is, de-
tecting information leakage. This security property is orthogonal to integrity,
thus the results obtained are independent one another. Our starting point is
the fact that the ordering information sent by the client cannot be disclosed
to other untrusted users of the system. We model this fact by labeling as high
ambients itemprice, creditcardnum, and address. Then, we apply the analysis
of [5], also supported by the tool, to verify if the process is secure and, if not,
which ambients should be labeled boundary in order to protect the system.
Using Banana, we can check that the analysis fails. In fact, in order to make
the execution of S | C process secure, the ordering information (i.e., ambient
itemprice) must be enclosed in a new boundary ambient which protects the
data when it moves out of the client. This requirement corresponds to the
SSL-protected network socket requirement of [15].
4 Comparisons and Conclusions
In [15] the authors informally described a simple E-Commerce case study.
They showed how to: express it in a highly abstract model of the SELinux op-
erating system access control mechanism; express integrity in temporal logic;
verify the integrity of the system using model checking.
In this paper we started from the informal description of the E-Commerce
system presented in [15] and we considered two diﬀerent approaches to study
its integrity:
• a dynamic veriﬁcation technique on the SPA language;
• a static analysis technique on Mobile Ambients.
As far as the modeling is concerned it is easy to see in the E-Commerce systems
we proposed there are many similarities, even if: in the SPA language we had
to add low level observable actions to check integrity; in Mobile Ambients we
had to exploit in, out, and open capabilities to simulate communications. On
the other hand, the main diﬀerences concern the veriﬁcation techniques we
used:
• the dynamic veriﬁcation technique is correct, no approximation is explicitly
introduced by the technique, and it does not require to model the intruder,
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but in the worst-case it has a time/space exponential cost;
• the static analysis technique gives us a partial result (thanks to Proposition
3.3) and it requires an explicit modeling of the intruder, but it has a (low)
polynomial complexity 4 .
Notice that in order to exploit the static analysis technique to verify integrity
we had to prove Proposition 3.3. In fact, we had to prove that, thanks to
particular syntactic hypothesis on the processes, the over-approximation is
limited. We are presently investigating a possible generalization of this result
not depending on the particular system under analysis.
The basic results we get with the two analyses are comparable: the intrud-
ers we found in Mobile Ambients correspond to the fact that in SPA without
restriction the model is not secure. After getting such common results, we
moved into diﬀerent directions in order to analyze as many aspects as possi-
ble: in SPA we applied a restriction over channels and we added other details
to the model; in Mobile Ambients we studied syntactic restrictions which allow
us to discriminate a priori a large number of intruders.
The above considerations suggest a natural combination of the two tech-
niques: apply the dynamic veriﬁcation technique when the static analysis one
does not prove the integrity.
Comparing our analysis with the results in [15] we notice that the model
presented in [15] aims at representing the access control policy of SELinux,
while our models are more abstract: we decide/infer that some channels have
to be secure without describing how to implement them. As a consequence
also the integrity results discussed in [15] are strongly related to the imple-
mentation of the system in SELinux, e.g., the system satisﬁes the integrity
goal assuming that the administrators are trustworthy.
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